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Abstract
Semiconductor manufacturing defects adversely affect yield and reliability.
Manufacturers expend vast resources to reduce defects within their processes. As the
minimum feature size get smaller, defects become increasingly difficult to prevent.
Defects can change the behavior of a logic circuit resulting in a fault. Manufacturers and
designers may improve yield, reliability, and profitability by using design techniques that
make products robust even in the presence of faults. Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is
a fault tolerant technique commonly used to mask faults using voting outcomes from
three processing elements (PE). TMR is effective at masking errors as long as no more
than a single processing element is faulty.
Time distributed voting (TDV) is proposed as an active fault tolerant technique.
TDV addresses the shortcomings of triple modular redundancy (TMR) in the presence of
multiple faulty processing elements. A faulty PE may not be incorrect 100% of the time.
When a faulty element generates correct results, a majority is formed with the healthy PE.
TDV observes voting outcomes over time to make a statistical decision whether a PE is
healthy or faulty. In simulation, fault coverage is extended to 98.6% of multiple faulty PE
cases. As an active fault tolerant technique, TDV identifies faulty PE’s so that actions
may be taken to replace or disable them in the system. TDV may provide a positive
impact to semiconductor manufacturers by improving yield and reliability even as fault
frequency increases.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The integrated circuit has become commonplace in nearly every facet of modern
civilization. Innovations to the integrated circuit, over several decades, have led to
advances in computing, communication, education, entertainment, health care, travel, and
weaponry. Semiconductor manufacturers relentlessly pursue smaller feature sizes and
lower power consumption to reduce costs and increase the capability of products they
produce. The feature size refers to the dimensions used when printing circuitry on a
semiconductor part using a photolithography process. Transistor gate length, metal-wire
width and the placement pitch are semiconductor features that can be minimized in order
to fit more circuitry into a given area. Smaller feature size allows for greater transistor
density and component integration. For example, CPU manufacturers like Intel and AMD
are now integrating essential computer components from chipsets and expansion cards
directly into the CPU. Products exist today in which the memory controller hub, PCIExpress interface, graphics processor, caches, and multimedia encoder/decoder are
fabricated directly on the CPU die. Integration is possible and cost effective because a
smaller feature size allows for greater circuit density with a fixed manufacturing cost.
Semiconductor manufacturers must be mindful of random manufacturing defects
as they attempt to shrink the feature size. A random defect is an imperfection introduced
during the fabrication process. Defects can be attributed to impurities in the crystalline
structure, particles, equipment malfunction, variations in temperature or pressure, or
variations in the process. Random defects appear in different shapes and sizes. Some
defects are too small to adversely affect the circuit. Larger defects may cause shorts or
1

opens in the circuitry, resulting in failures or faults. Defects larger than one-tenth the
minimum feature size may cause rare faults. Typical manufacturing processes guard
against defects that are larger than one-third of the minimum feature size [2] as they are
most likely to cause faults. Defect density (λ) is specified in units of defects per unit area
and impacts the frequency of defects large enough to cause a fault.
Typically, each new process generation reduces the minimum feature size. As the
minimum feature size gets smaller, the impact of random defect size and density
increases. The manufacturing process must continually improve in order to keep defect
density at an acceptable level [2]. Figure 1 shows the decrease in allowable defect density
and size with respect to the minimum feature size [2]. Figure 1 shows that, as minimum
the feature size (x-axis) decreases, the allowable defect density (left axis) decreases. The
size of defect included in defect density (right axis) also decreases, but at a faster rate
than defect density. The implication of Figure 1 is that designs using a smaller feature
size are susceptible to failure due to smaller defects. The problem is compounded by the
reality that smaller defects occur at a higher relative frequency than large defects as
shown in Figure 2 [2]. Acceptable defect density will become increasingly difficult to
achieve with each successive process generation.
Manufacturers employ techniques to improve manufacturing yield and product
reliability in the presence of faults. Lockstep triple modular redundancy (TMR) is one
such technique. Lockstep TMR utilizes triplicated processing elements (PE) and majority
voting to mask faults. As long as a majority of PE’s are fault-free, majority voting will
mask erroneous results and only propagate correct results [5]. Lockstep TMR may
preserve manufacturing yield or provide fault tolerance against online faults [4]. When
2

one of the PEs contains a fault, whether from a manufacturing defect or an online failure,
the remaining two PE’s form a majority and evict or mask the erroneous result.

Figure 1: Defect density and size with respect to the minimum feature size [2].
As the minimum feature size (X-axis) gets smaller, defect density (left-axis)
decreases, and the size of defect included in defect density (right-axis) also
decreases.

Figure 2: Relative frequency of defects with respect to size [2].

Designers that utilize TMR assume that, at most, only a single PE ever contains a
fault [6]. If multiple faulty elements are present, aliasing may occur. Aliasing is when
3

two faulty results form a majority and evict the correct result. Figure 3 shows a simple
example of how aliasing occurs. Figure 3 shows three PE’s performing the function of a
two-input NAND gate. The Golden element contains no fault, while Faulty1 and Faulty2
elements each contain different faults. In this work, faults are modeled as stuck-at-0
(SA0) or stuck-at-1 (SA1). The node where the fault occurs is constrained to the stuck-at
value, independent of the logic around it. The truth table shows that for the input pattern
(A=0, B=1), Faulty1 and Faulty2 elements both generate faulty results that form a voting
majority. In this simple example, the correct result would be evicted and the faulty result
would be propagated because of its majority status.
Some fault pairs are expected to generate aliased results. Faults that modify
circuit behavior in the same way are called, equivalent, dominant, or collapsible faults.
For example, if one PE contained a SA1 on the input of an inverter and another PE
contained a SA0 on the output of the same inverter, both PE’s would exhibit the same
syndrome and the faults would be equivalent. When activated by an input pattern,
equivalent faults generate aliased results because they are, in effect, the same faulty
circuit. The faults displayed in Figure 3, are not equivalent, dominant, or collapsible, yet
they generate aliased results. Aliasing extends beyond equivalent fault pairs and presents
a challenge to hardware redundancy in the presence of multiple faults. Future
technologies may produce devices so small that achievable defect density cannot protect
against the likelihood of multiple faulty PE’s in a TMR system. Additionally, if TMR is
used to protect yield, any online fault may constitute the second faulty PE [4].
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A
C

B
Golden

A
SA1

B

C

Faulty 1

A
SA0
C

B
Faulty 2

Truth Table
A B C [Golden] C [Faulty 1] C [Faulty 2]
0 0
1
0
1
0 1
1
0
0
1 0
1
0
1
1 1
0
0
0
Figure 3: Example of Aliasing when multiple processing elements are faulty.
The faults shown in Faulty 1 and Faulty 2 circuits are not equivalent or collapsible,
but they still generate identical faulty results.

In most cases, even a faulty PE is correct part of the time. When a faulty PE
generates correct results, it votes in favor of the non-faulty PE. If two PE’s are faulty, but
not generating aliased results, a statistical, time-distributed voting model may be able to a
correctly identify the non-faulty PE by observing which element(s) are in the majority
most of the time.
This thesis will explore the impact of multiple faulty PE’s in a TMR system and
propose a time-distributed voting model to extend the usefulness of TMR to systems with
multiple faulty PE’s. The proposed design is effective for multiple faulty PE’s as long as
5

they do not contain aliasing fault pairs. The design will also enable each PE instance to
operate on its own independent data stream. This thesis will summarize the potential for
improved throughput and efficiency, while remaining fault tolerant against single and
multiple faults using modified TMR methods.

6

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Semiconductor Defects and Faults
In the semiconductor manufacturing process, an imperfection that occurs during
processing is called a defect. When a defect modifies the behavior of a given circuit to
the point of failure, it becomes a fault. There are a large variety of defects that can cause
faults. Figure 4 from [2] shows examples of two defects that commonly cause faults
during the manufacturing process. These include a defect shorting two metal lines
together (Figure 4a) and a void in a metal line resulting in an open (Figure 4b).

Figure 4: Conductor Defects [2].
(a) Short between parallel metal lines, material deposited where it should not be.
(b) Open metal line, material not deposited where it should be.

Defects do not always result in faults. There is a close relationship between defect
size and fault occurrence. This relationship is largely dependent on the minimum feature
size of the process. If a defect is much smaller than the minimum feature size defined
within a process, then the likelihood of it causing a fault is small. The small defect may
be permanently contained within the part and never cause any adverse effect. However, if
a defect is close to or larger than the minimum feature size, then the probability of it
causing a fault increases. As the manufacturing process continues to evolve, smaller
7

transistors, and denser designs will become more sensitive to smaller defects that are
increasingly difficult to prevent.
A defect may induce a fault that renders the part defective at the completion of the
manufacturing process. When the fault is observed during test, the part is rejectedas a
yield loss. Conversely, a part may pass initial testing and then fail during its useful
lifetime due to latent faults. Examples of common defects that cause latent faults are
shown in Figure 5 [2]. In Figure 5a, a metal line with a partial non-conductive void may
behave as expected during test, but the reduced cross-sectional area of the line results in
higher current density. Over time, the higher current density stresses the line causing it to
fail due to electro migration resulting in an open circuit. In Figure 5b, metal lines with a
conductive particle partially bridging the gap between them increases the electric field
through the insulator when differential voltages are present. Over time this increased
electric field breaks down the insulator separating the metal lines and the lines become
shorted together. In both of these cases as with a myriad of failure models, the part may
not actually fail until a significant amount of time has passed in normal operation.

Figure 5: Illustration of defects that cause latent faults [2].
(a) Defect causing a clear field in the metal line, resulting in current crowding.
(b) Defect leaving material between two metal lines causing high electric field.
8

Manufacturers must guard against defects that may cause manufacturing and
latent faults. Semiconductor defect density describes the average number of random
defects per unit area that are likely to cause faults. Defect density is a critical indicator of
process health and yield [2][4]. Poisson statistics are used to predict yield fallout from
defects. If circuit area and the defect density for a manufacturing process are known, the
probability of observing exactly n defects is calculated by the equation shown in Figure
6e. The Poisson equation in Figure 6e assumes random defects to be uniformly
distributed.
(a)

 = 
 = 
=
=



 

 
=   
 
 =     

,  =
exp−
!

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Figure 6: Poisson statistics
P(n,λ) computes the probability that the part contains exactly n defects when
average number of defects per unit (λ) is known.

Slight increases in defect density may have a large impact on yield. Designs that
are salvageable in the presence of defects and faults help to mitigate the otherwise costly
yield fallout. Several strategies, including hardware redundancy, exist which allow a
circuit to continue to operate or gracefully degrade when faults occur. The next two
sections will review fault tolerance and hardware redundancy as viable design
methodologies to manage circuit operation in the presence of faults.
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2.2 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance
Semiconductor manufacturers go to great lengths to reduce defects within their
process, but defects cannot be eliminated completely. Manufacturers can minimize the
effect defects have on yield and reliability by utilizing hardware redundancy in their
designs. Redundancy refers to the use of multiple processing elements (PE) to handle
failures. If one instance fails, a redundant element may be used to accomplish the task.
Redundancy is utilized in systems across many disciplines to improve reliability. A
suspension bridge utilizes redundant support cables to distribute the load evenly and
ensure the bridge does not collapse if a single cable fails. Hospitals use backup power
generators to supply power during a utility outage. Hard drives can be configured in a
RAID array such that no data is lost if a single drive fails. In all these cases the goal of
the designers is to avoid undesired behavior due to a single point of failure.
Semiconductor manufacturers use redundancy to make designs more robust.
When fabrication of a design is complete the part is tested. If individual components in
the part are faulty, the part may be repaired by activating a redundant component or
utilizing an alternate data path. When repair is not possible, faulty components may be
disabled and the part sold at a lower price or used for an alternate purpose. For example,
the part may have less cache available, or may have a graphics or audio module disabled;
however, it need not be wholly scrapped.
Hardware redundancy is used by semiconductor manufacturers to account for
latent and online faults. Latent faults are undetectable when the part is initially tested, but
fail during the part’s useful lifetime. Fault tolerance is a design methodology which
enables a part to continue to operate after a fault has occurred. Active and passive
10

techniques exist for achieving fault tolerance. The passive technique attempts to mask
faulty results as they occur. The active technique attempts to identify faulty hardware and
remove it from the system [6]. N-Modular Redundancy (NMR) is an example of a
passive technique. NMR uses multiple PE’s and majority voting to mask erroneous
results and prevent them from getting propagated. As long as a majority of PE’s is
healthy, majority voting can effectively mask errors [6].

2.3 Lockstep TMR
Lockstep Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is a passive NMR approach in which
only three PE’s are used with majority voting to select the correct result [6]. Figure 7
graphically shows data flow through a (TMR) fault tolerant system containing a single
faulty PE (dotted-line). Since two of the PE’s are healthy, the faulty result gets discarded
when the vote is executed. The voting algorithm is executed continuously. Each output is
verified by majority to ensure it is correct. Majority voting may be conducted at the bit
level or the word level depending on the application. Word level voting compares PE
results in their entirety. An indeterminate state may be reached if all three PE’s compute
different results. Bit level voting generates the system output using a majority
determination from each bitwise comparison of the PE results. Bit-level voting does not
allow for indeterminate states when multiple PE’s are faulty. When only a single PE is
faulty, Lockstep TMR will obtain the correct output value using bit level or word level
voting. Lockstep TMR becomes unreliable or indeterminate when multiple PE’s are
faulty. TMR may improve yield fallout by masking faults caused by manufacturing
defects. When one element in a TMR system is already faulty due to a manufacturing
11

defect and a second element incurs an online or latent fault during normal operation,
majority voting is no longer able to identify the correct result [6]. Majority voting in a
TMR system is only guaranteed to be correct when a single element is faulty. Multiple
faulty PE’s may produce identical yet incorrect results. Aliasing occurs when two
identical, yet incorrect results form a majority and evict or mask the correct result. When
aliasing occurs, the TMR system propagates erroneous data without detection.
Input
8888ffff

16-bit
Mult
[0]

16-bit
Mult
[1]

16-bit
Mult
[2]

Result[0]
88777777

Result[1]
88877778

Result[2]
88877778

Majority Voting
Algorithm

Output
88877778

Figure 7: A 16-bit multiplier TMR implementation.
Three 16-bit multiplier modules operate on the same input data. Module 0 is faulty.
Modules 1 & 2 are not faulty and form a majority. The faulty result from module 0
is masked at the output.

The yield and reliability benefits of TMR come at a cost. Additional area is
required for the redundant PE’s and voting algorithm. Additional power is required to
compute triplicated results and execute the voting algorithm for every input cycle. TMR
does not conduct a thorough check of all possible faults in the PE. The only faults that are
12

checked are those that are activated by the input patterns. Faults existing within one or
more PE’s may remain dormant and unobserved by the voting algorithm if no input is
presented to activate the fault.
Space compaction is a compression technique which attempts to propagate any
errors in a circuit from input to output [1]. Compaction generates a signature key to
uniquely identify a distinct fault state in the circuit. In a triple redundant system with
signature keys generated for each PE, faults are detectable if keys form a majority.
However, when multiple PE's are faulty, a different signature key will be generated for
each PE. Space compaction does not provide reliable detection of multiple faulty PE's
because a vote on three different signature keys would return an ambiguous outcome.
In safety critical devices, an emergency is the worst time to discover a previously
undetected fault. Some input patterns that would activate faults within critical circuitry
occur rarely online. For example, the defibrillation circuitry in an implantable
cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) is activated only when a dangerous rhythm is detected in
the heart. This circuitry delivers an electric shock to return the heart to a normal sinus
rhythm. Even though this defibrillation circuitry is rarely used, if it malfunctions at the
onset of a heart attack or other cardiac event, the results could be catastrophic. TMR
operates only on the input patterns received while online. A failure in the defibrillation
circuitry due to multiple faulty elements would be undetectable until a cardiac event
actually occurs. A preferable fault tolerant approach would be to continually test for
faults in the entire system and identify failures, while there is time and opportunity to
respond to them.
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2.4 Fault Cones and Aliasing
Designers of TMR systems assume that, at most, only one processing element is
faulty. When this assumption fails, aliasing may occur. Aliasing at either the bit level or
the word level occurs when two faulty results agree forming a majority, and the correct
result is voted out by the voting algorithm. Aliasing risk is determined by the fault cone
associated with each potential fault in a system. A fault cone refers to the propagation of
a fault through a processing element to the output bits where the fault becomes
observable. Figure 8 illustrates graphically the effect of fault cones within a processing
element. The fault f1 affects output bits 1 and 2, f2 affects output bits 5 and 6, and f3
affects output bits 3, 4, and 5. The issue of primary concern is the activation of f2 and f3
faults simultaneously. Since f2 and f3 fault cones overlap across output bit 5, a scenario
exists in which PE2 and PE3 may agree and create a majority. The fault cone merely
provides a description of which output bits may be affected by a given fault. Some output
bits in the fault cone may be correct when the associated fault is activated. When f2 flips
only bit 5 and f3 flips only bit 5, then their outputs will mutually agree on the incorrect
result. Equal, yet erroneous results are the source of aliasing and underscore the
limitations of TMR.
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i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7

i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7

PE1

f1

i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7

PE2

PE3
f3

f2

o0 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
f1 activated
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

f2 activated
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

f3 activated
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

o0 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
Bit-level voter
no fault observed
f3 observed
f2 observed
possible aliasing: on o5
f1 observed
no bit level aliasing
no bit level aliasing
possible aliasing on o5

o0 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7

Word-level Voter
no fault observed
f3 observed
f2 observed
possible word aliasing
f1 observed
indeterminate
indeterminate
indeterminate

Comment

f2 and f3 cones overlap
f1 and f3 do not overlap
fl and f2 do not overlap

Figure 8: Fault cone illustration
The fault f1 affects output bits 1 and 2; f2 affects output bits 5 and 6; f3 affects
output bits 3, 4 and 5. Overlap of f2 and f3 at output bit 5 indicates potential
aliasing.

Table 1 demonstrates how aliasing may adversely affect the outcome of the voting
algorithm by casting out the correct processing element result. The correct result is
denoted by X. The Y and Z values are different, incorrect results. In cases 1-5, TMR
works as expected by identifying X as the passing result. However, in cases 6-8, the
healthy PE is determined to be faulty due to aliasing.
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Table 1: Aliasing in TMR
Identity

AxB=X

Case

Input

PE1
Result

PE2
Result

PE3
Result

PE1
Vote

PE2
Vote

PE3
Vote

Voting Result

Disposition

1

AxB

X

X

X

Pass

Pass

Pass

No Fault

Correct

2

AxB

Y

X

X

Fail

Pass

Pass

PE1 Faulty

Correct

3

AxB

X

Y

X

Pass

Fail

Pass

PE2 Faulty

Correct

4

AxB

X

X

Y

Pass

Pass

Fail

PE3 Faulty

Correct

5

AxB

X

Y

Z

Fail

Fail

Fail

Indeterminate

Correct

6

AxB

X

Y

Y

Fail

Pass

Pass

PE1 Faulty

Incorrect

7

AxB

Y

X

Y

Pass

Fail

Pass

PE2 Faulty

Incorrect

8

AxB

Y

Y

X

Pass

Pass

Fail

PE3 Faulty

Incorrect

Table 1 demonstrates outcomes using word-level voting. Bit-level and word-level
voting methodologies are not equivalent. Bit-level voting never reaches an indeterminate
outcome since there are only two possible values (logic 0 and logic 1) that may be
contained in each bit. Since there are an odd number of PE’s, a majority will always be
observed for each bit. Word-level voting may reach an indeterminate outcome when all
PE’s compute different results. An indeterminate voting result is a useful indicator that at
least two processing elements contain faults.
In this thesis, time-distributed voting (TDV) is proposed. TDV is an alternative
methodology to lockstep TMR that is developed to address cases when one or two PE’s
are faulty. The TDV method is to observe majority voting outcomes over time. Faulty
PE’s may not be wrong all the time. When a fault is not activated by the input pattern, the
result will be correct and the faulty PE will vote in agreement with the healthy PE. A
statistical opportunity exists for faulty PE(s) to help identify the healthy PE(s). Fault
cones provide insight to cases where TDV may be successful. If the fault cones for two
faulty PE’s do not overlap, then aliasing cannot occur, and all observed majority voting
16

outcomes will favor the healthy PE. Effectively, the PE’s are in competition with each
other and the highest scoring PE(s) is the winner.
TDV is an active fault tolerant method which attempts to identify faulty PE’s,
rather than mask erroneous results. Conceding that multiple PE’s may be faulty, removes
the benefit of voting in lockstep since doing so would propagate faulty results. The
proposed design removes the lockstep constraint and enables each PE to operate on its
own independent data stream. In order to create voting opportunities, pseudorandom
input patterns are interleaved into the independent data streams for each PE at a fixed
rate. The pseudorandom patterns are capable of providing high fault coverage of all
possible faults in the PE. Since the lockstep constraint is removed, a mechanism is
required that can identify patterns common to all data streams, capture the PE results
when they become available and execute the majority voting algorithm. In this thesis, the
content addressable memory (CAM) has been chosen to handle commonality detection
and capture the appropriate PE results. The next section provides an overview of the
CAM used in the proposed design.

2.5 Content Addressable Memory (CAM)
The methodology proposed in this thesis allows multiple processing elements
(PE) to operate on independent data streams. Each PE may operate on a different input
pattern in each computation cycle. Majority voting is no longer viable for every
computation cycle. Instead, voting occurs when patterns are observed to be common to
all input data streams. Due to the continuous nature of streaming data, the entire data
stream cannot be searched simultaneously. In order to observe commonalities, a window
17

must be drawn around the portion of each data stream closest to the processing element.
The window is implemented as a first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffer. The input pattern getting
processed during a computation cycle is referred to as the active input. Commonalities
are observed by searching each FIFO buffer for the active inputs from the mutually
exclusive data streams. Figure 9 illustrates how commonalities are detected. The arrows
indicate the active input for each data stream. In the FIFO, data remains stationary while
a pointer cycles through each location within the buffer. After the data is used, it is
replaced with the next input pattern from the data stream.

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Stream[0]
108
FF
137
11C
→
132
100
12C
116
117
13D
PE_REG[0]
PE_Output[0]

Stream[1]
13C
119
136
13A
→
116
112
11E
114
110
117

132 PE_REG[1]
B2 PE_Output[1]

Stream[2]
136
109
116
101
→
12E
111
117
108
114
119

116 PE_REG[2]
96 PE_Output[2]

12E
AE

Figure 9: Data stream commonality detection
The active input (116) in Stream[1] is common to Stream[0] and Stream[2]. When
this commonality is detected and the results aligned, majority voting is executed.

The active input (116) from Stream[1] exists in both Stream[0] and Stream[2]. If
the results are captured and aligned, a majority voting opportunity exists. The voting
opportunity is realized by storing the PE_Output[1] value obtained in the current clock
cycle as well as PE_Output[0] and PE_Output[2] when they become available in future
clock cycles. When all PE_Output results become available, the majority voting
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algorithm will be executed to determine if any faults are observed. In the proposed
design, content addressable memory (CAM) cells have been used to construct the FIFO
buffers for each processing element. CAM cells enable a fully associative search of the
FIFO buffers for the active input patterns from the other two data streams. The search is
completed in a single clock cycle.
The CAM cell design requires a memory element, search lines, match lines, and
comparison circuitry. Figure 10 from [7] shows cascaded NOR-type CAM cells with a
timing diagram. During SL precharge, slpre is asserted to precharge low all search lines
(SL, SL ). During ML precharge, mlpre is de-asserted to precharge ML high. Once
ML is high, slpre and mlpre are de-asserted and ML evaluate begins. For each stored bit,
either SL or SL is asserted high to assert the search value. If the search value does not
match the stored value, a discharge path is established for ML to reflect the mismatch.
NOR-type CAM cells discharge the ML whenever any stored bit is mismatched to its
corresponding search value [7]. If the stored value matches the search value for all bits in
the word, the ML value remains high to indicate the match.
Figure 11 from [10] shows a cascaded NAND-type CAM. The NAND-type CAM
differs from the NOR-type in that the ML discharge path is established serially through
each bitcell’s pass transistor. NAND-type CAM cells use the same timing diagram shown
in Figure 10, except the ML is discharged only when the stored value and the search
value match.
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Figure 10: NOR-type CAM with timing diagram[10]

Figure 11: NAND-type CAM cell[10]
When any bit-cell value Q matches its associated search line value SL, a current
path is created to discharge the match line ML_A through the matching bit. A
mismatch is indicated by the ML_A signal maintaining an active high value.
20

Circuit designers can optimize power consumption and performance by selecting
an appropriate CAM topology. Power is consumed each time the ML in a CAM cell is
pre-charged from low or discharged due to a search event. If ML is rarely discharged, the
CAM will consume less power. In the proposed design, data stream commonalities are
expected to be rare events compared to cycles where no commonality is detected. The
NAND-type CAM is ideal because ML will only be discharged in the rare cases that a
commonality is detected. If a NOR-type CAM were used for this design, the match line
would be discharged for every input cycle where a commonality is not observed,
consuming more power.
The CAM topology affects performance and requires additional area for storage
and match detection circuitry. Area is determined by the size of memory array needed
and the number of search fields implemented. Performance is determined by the delay
associated with pre-charging and discharging ML. A NOR-type CAM is typically faster
than a NAND-type CAM because the NOR-type CAM can discharge the match line
through any one or more mismatched bitcells. The NAND-type CAM discharges the ML
serially through all bitcells when a match is observed.

2.6 Processing Element: The ISCAS 85 C6288 Benchmark
The ISCAS ‘85 C6288 benchmark circuit was used to evaluate the proposed
design. The C6288 benchmark is a matrix implementation of a 16-bit multiplier utilizing
32 input bits, and 32 output bits. The Verilog implementation of the benchmark contains
2448 discrete nodes. Each node may be simulated as a stuck-at-0 (SA0) or a stuck-at-1
(SA1) fault. The benchmark provides 4,896 possible faults to evaluate the design.
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Articles for the C6288 benchmark provide a minimum set of 12 engineered test patterns
for fault testing [3]. The C6288 multiplier consists of a 15x16 matrix of full and half
adders as shown in Figure 12. Each half or full adder is implemented as shown in Figure
13 with interconnectivity described in Figure 14.

Figure 12: ISCAS-85 C6288 16x16 Multiplier [3]

Figure 13: Adder module used in C6288 benchmark [3]
The 15 top-row half adders lack the C_i input; each has two inverters at locations
V. The single half adder in the bottom row lacks the B input, thereby acquiring two
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inverters at locations W.

Figure 14: Alternate depiction of C6288 Multiplier showing connectivity [3]
The input combinations are AND’ed together to form input to the half and full
adders.

Each row in the C6288 matrix computes a partial product used in the
multiplication. The output bits are computed by summing the skewed partial products for
each column in the matrix and propagating carry bits to the left adjacent column. The
Half adders used in the C6288 are modified full adders with one input removed.
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Chapter 3

Design

3.1 Methods
Verilog HDL is used to facilitate evaluation of the time distributed voting
algorithm. The C6288 benchmark is a structural Verilog implementation of a 16-bit
multiplier. In order to evaluate the faulty behavior of the C6288, faults need to be
injected. The faults that need to be injected are stuck-at-0 (SA0) and stuck-at-1 (SA1)
faults for every node in the C6288 circuit. Fault injection in accomplished using Verilog
force and release procedural statements. The force statement overrides a node’s logic
value with the specified force value. Once the force statement is executed, the affected
node holds the forced value until the release statement is executed. The release statement
returns the node to its nominal behavior.
Pseudorandom input patterns are used to activate the injected faults. The
pseudorandom patterns were obtained using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The
patterns generated in an LFSR have some uniformity as each pattern is identical to the
previous pattern with the exception of one bit. To overcome this uniformity, LFSR
patterns were only collected after completely shifting the previous pattern out of the
LFSR. This method was used to collect 1,200 pseudorandom patterns for fault excitation.
The faulty behavior of the C6288 is characterized, using single stuck at faults. A
simple Verilog test-bench was used to force a fault in the C6288 PE. All 1,200
pseudorandom patterns were then cycled through the faulty PE while collecting the
results. This process was repeated for all 4,896 single stuck-at faults in the PE to generate
a table with 4,896 fault rows by 1,200 input patterns. The data table is used as the basis
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for simulation of fault combinations.
The analysis in this thesis includes a characterization of fault pairs. A fault pair or
fault combination is defined as two discrete single stuck-at faults injected into two
distinct processing elements. The characterization is completed by exhaustively
simulating all possible combinations of two single stuck-at faults in the C6288. A Verilog
HDL prototype has been developed to demonstrate an implementation of TDV. The
prototype, however, is not optimal for obtaining the volume data needed for fault pair
analysis. Fault pair analysis was done by hashing fault rows in the data table to observe
voting outcome’s when one PE is healthy, and two PE’s are afflicted by different faults.
A Microsoft VBA script was used to perform the data hashing. The next four sections
will provide a more detailed description of the processes uses to accomplish the analysis.

3.2 Proposed TDV Design Overview
Lockstep TMR is a passive fault tolerant technique which uses majority voting to
mask erroneous data from a single faulty processing element (PE). Lockstep TMR is not
effective when more than one PE is faulty. The primary objective of the proposed design
is to improve fault tolerance in the presence of multiple faulty PE’s. Time distributed
voting (TDV) is proposed in this thesis as an alternative to lockstep TMR. TDV is an
active fault tolerant technique designed to identify which PE(s) are faulty and which ones
are not. TDV achieves the same coverage as lockstep TMR for single faulty PE’s, while
extending coverage to non-aliasing cases of multiple faulty PE’s. Conveniently, the
proposed design may also lead to improvements in performance and efficiency by
allowing redundant PE’s to operate on separate and independent data streams.
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When a PE contains a fault, it may not generate erroneous results 100% of the
time. A faulty PE only generates erroneous results for a subset of input patterns that
activate the fault. The input patterns that do not activate the fault will generate correct
results matching those from a healthy PE. This observation creates a statistical
opportunity to identify non-faulty elements using word-level majority voting. In order to
exploit this statistical opportunity, each processing element has an associated weight.
Weights are updated every time a majority vote is executed. The rules for updating these
weights are detailed in Table 2. In the case where all results match, no fault is observed
and the weights remain unchanged. When a single result is mismatched, the majority
weights are incremented and the minority weights are decremented by one. When all PE
results are mismatched, multiple PE’s are faulty, but the majority vote provides no insight
about which element is faulty or if all elements are faulty. In the case where all results are
mismatched, the weights remain unchanged.
Table 2: Method for updating PE weights based on majority voting results.
Input Pattern

Result[0]

Result[1]

Result[2]

Weight[0]

Weight[1]

Weight[2]

A

X

X

X

+0

+0

+0

A

Y

X

X

-1

+1

+1

A

X

Y

X

+1

-1

+1

A

X

X

Y

+1

+1

-1

A

X

Y

Z

+0

+0

+0

As majority voting occurs over time, the updated weights form a prediction about
which element(s) if any are faulty. The weights are interpreted as shown in Table 3. The
X, Y, and Z values shown in the table represent final PE weights after TDV and are
related as X>Y>Z. In all cases, the PE with the greatest positive value (+X) is identified
as healthy. When two PE’s tie for first place (+X), both are identified as healthy. When
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two PE’s contain values of smaller magnitude that are equal and opposite, (+/-Y,-/+Y),
both are identified as faulty. When two PE’s contain values of smaller magnitude that are
not equal and opposite, (+/-Y,+/-Z), both are identified as faulty with aliasing observed
for some input patterns.
Table 3: Interpretation of final PE weights after TDV.
Weight PE[0] Weight PE[1] Weight PE[2]
0
0
0
-X
+X
+X
+X
-X
+X
+X
+X
-X
+X
+Y
-Y
-Y
+X
+Y
+Y
-Y
+X
+X
+/-Y
+/-Z
+/-Z
+X
+/-Y
+/-Y
+/-Z
+X

Interpretation (X > Y > Z)
No Fault Observed in any element
PE[0] is faulty; PE[1] and PE[2] are not faulty
PE[1] is faulty; PE[0] and PE[2] are not faulty
PE[2] is faulty; PE[0] and PE[1] are not faulty
PE[0] is not faulty; PE[1] and PE[2] are faulty
PE[1] is not faulty; PE[2] and PE[0] are faulty
PE[2] is not faulty; PE[0] and PE[1] are faulty
PE[0] is not faulty; PE[1] and PE[2] are faulty (aliasing observed)
PE[1] is not faulty; PE[2] and PE[0] are faulty (aliasing observed)
PE[2] is not faulty; PE[0] and PE[1] are faulty (aliasing observed)

3.3 Prototype Implementation
The proposed design has been implemented in Verilog HDL. Verilog provides an
efficient, logical environment for observing data flow and fault simulation. Figure 15
contains the block diagram of the proposed design. Dotted lines indicate contributions
from this thesis. The FIFO buffers deliver stream data to the processing elements. The
CAM cells used in the FIFO buffers contain two search fields and two match line outputs,
and are referred to as double-ported. Using double-ported CAM cells, the FIFO contents
may be searched for matches to the active input patterns from the other two data streams.
Each cycle, the active input for each stream is forwarded to a search field in the other two
buffers. Table 4 contains the search field inputs for each buffer and the conditions that
would identify a buffer’s active input as a commonality. When a commonality is
detected, the input pattern is stored in the common symbol array and the corresponding
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PE result is stored in the results array. The common symbol array holds the common
input patterns until results from other processing elements become available and majority
voting occurs.
Table 4: Commonality detection using CAM cell FIFO buffers.
Buffer Active Input
FIFO[0]
A
FIFO[1]
B
FIFO[2]
C

Search Field 1
B
C
A

Search Field 2
C
A
B

Commonality Condition
MW1[2] && MW2[1]
MW1[0] && MW2[2]
MW1[1] && MW2[0]

The common symbol array is implemented using triple-ported CAM cells. Three
search fields correspond to the active inputs for the 3 FIFO buffers. When a commonality
is detected, the common symbol array is searched to determine if the pattern is already
present and add it to the array if needed. The common symbol array indexes into the
result arrays to store latent results when common patterns finally make their way to the
processing elements. Finite states in the PE are not considered when commonalities are
detected in the FIFO. It is assumed that the PE’s contain only combinational logic since
stated logic may change as input patterns progress to the PE.
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Figure 15: Block Diagram of Proposed Design
Data flows through the FIFO buffer, into the processing element, and to the output
data stream. Surrounding circuitry (dotted lines) monitors for stream commonalities
and performs majority voting when commonality results become available.
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3.4 Implementing the Multi-Ported CAM in Verilog
The FIFO buffers and the common symbol array in the proposed design are
implemented using CAM cells in Verilog HDL. CAM cells enable a fully associative
search of the buffer contents. Each buffer needs to be searched for the active input
patterns from the other two data streams. The common symbol array needs to be searched
for the active input patterns from all three data streams. The conventional NAND-Type
CAM cell only contains one search field. Additional search fields, match lines, and
comparison logic have been added to the CAM cells used in this design so that multiple
searches may occur concurrently. The modified CAM cells are described as multi-ported.
Two variations of multi-ported CAM cells are needed. A double-ported version is
used in the FIFO buffers, and a triple-ported version is used in the common symbol array.
The number of ports that a CAM cell has refers to the number of input search patterns a
CAM cell can operate on. Figure 16 contains the Verilog behavioral implementation of
the multi-ported CAM cells used in this design. The first snippet (lines 27-36) is the
double-ported CAM cell which has inputs for the stored memory value (q), and two
search lines (sl1 and sl2). The outputs (node1 and node2) are asserted high whenever the
value of their respective search line input matches the stored memory value. The second
snippet (lines 38-49) is the triple-ported CAM cell. It is identical to the double-ported
CAM cell except that it also has a third search line input (sl3) and a third output (node3).
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Figure 16: Multi-Port CAM modules in Verilog.
The double-ported CAM contains a storage value (q), 2 search lines (sl1 and sl2)
and 2 match indicators (node1 and node2). The triple-ported CAM contains a
storage value (q), search lines (sl1, sl2 and sl3) and 3 match indicators (node1,
node2, and node3.
A multi-ported CAM cell is instantiated for each stored bit in the FIFO buffers
and common symbol array. All CAM bitcells for a word are connected serially using the
same match line. When a match occurs, all node outputs for a corresponding search field
will be asserted high. A match creates a discharge path to drop the precharged match line
value low. In the proposed design, registers are used as the memory element while the
CAM logic performs the search functions.
A de-asserted match line, for any word in the FIFO buffer, indicates that the
corresponding search pattern has been found. A commonality is observed when the active
input word for any single buffer is observed to exist anywhere in both of the other two
buffers. When commonalities are observed in the FIFO buffers, the common input pattern
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is stored in the common symbol array.
The common symbol array uses the active input patterns from the data streams as
search fields. When a match is detected in the common symbol array, it indicates that a
common pattern has arrived at the processing element and the result needs to be stored in
the results array so it is available for majority voting. The common symbol array aligns
the result arrays to their associated input pattern. Match lines are used to index into the
correct position in the results array and capture the PE result when it becomes available.
Valid flags are set to indicate the results are available. When results are available from all
data streams for a given input pattern, the majority voting algorithm is initiated.

3.5 Evaluating faults in the C6288 Benchmark
Fault simulation is completed iteratively using Verilog force and release
statements. Each possible fault in the C6288 is indexed in a table and associated with an
integer value referred to as its fault node. There are 4,896 fault nodes in the C6288
Verilog benchmark used in this design. On the first fault node iteration, no fault is
injected, and input test patterns are cycled through the processing element to produce
correct results. In subsequent fault node iterations, a single fault is injected into the
processing element and the input test patterns are processed with the fault present. The
Verilog code snippet in Figure 17 shows the proper use of the Verilog force and release
statements to cycle through all the possible faults.
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Figure 17: Code snippet for injecting stuck-at faults during simulation
The force statement turns on a specific fault, release statement turns off the
previous fault.

The simulation generates a table with 4,897 rows and 1,200 columns. The first
row (fault node 0) contains the fault-free or “Golden” results for all input patterns. Each
subsequent row contains results for the same input patterns simulated with a different
fault node. The resultant data table may then be hashed to observe the behavior of the
system for any singular fault or combination of faults.
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Chapter 4

Results

4.1 Operational Verification of the Design
A voting opportunity exists when an input pattern is common to all FIFO buffers.
CAMs search the buffers continuously to find commonalities. Figure 18 shows the
observation of a commonality during simulation. Each cam_reg column contains buffer
contents for one data stream with a depth of 32 words. Each row contains a 32-bit input
pattern en route to a processing element. A buffer’s asserted hit bit indicates that it’s
active input (pe_reg) has been found in all other buffers. In Figure 18 the active word
from the middle buffer is common to the first and third buffers. When a commonality is
detected, it gets stored in the common symbol array.
The asserted hit bit initiates a routine that stores the common input pattern to the
common symbol array (cam_comsym), captures the common pattern’s result in the results
array (result_reg), and sets flags to indicate that the result is valid. Figure 19 shows the
common pattern observed in Figure 18 added to the cam_comsym array and the PE result
stored in the results array. When PE results for the common pattern become available
from other buffers, they are stored and aligned in the results array with valid bits set.
When all valid bits are asserted, the voting algorithm is executed as shown in Figure 20.
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Cycle Count

2148

hit

0

1

0

pe_reg

32'hb31d1556

32'hffffd555

32'hba098745

result

32'h0eed8cbe

32'hd5542aab

32'h624ce36d

Index

cam_reg[0]

cam_reg[1]

cam_reg[2]

[0]

32'h4dd52192

32'hfaca8cd9

32'h23c17f7a

[1]

32'h26ea90c9

32'h7d65466c

32'h11e0bfbd

[2]

32'hb31d1556

32'hffffd555

32'hba098745

[3]

32'h598e8aab

32'h237f4ac5

32'h5d04c3a2

[4]

32'h2cc74555

32'h91bfa562

32'hae8261d1

[5]

32'h9663a2aa

32'hc8dfd2b1

32'hd74130e8

[6]

32'h4b31d155

32'h646fe958

32'heba09874

[7]

32'h2598e8aa

32'hb237f4ac

32'hf5d04c3a

[8]

32'h92cc7455

32'hd91bfa56

32'h7ae8261d

[9]

32'hc9663a2a

32'h6c8dfd2b

32'hbd74130e

[10]

32'hffffd555

32'h3646fe95

32'hdeba0987

[11]

32'h32598e8a

32'h9b237f4a

32'hef5d04c3

[12]

32'h192cc745

32'hcd91bfa5

32'hf7ae8261

[13]

32'h0c9663a2

32'h66c8dfd2

32'hfbd74130

[14]

32'h864b31d1

32'h33646fe9

32'hfdeba098

[15]

32'h432598e8

32'h19b237f4

32'hfef5d04c

[16]

32'h2192cc74

32'h8cd91bfa

32'h7f7ae826

[17]

32'h90c9663a

32'h466c8dfd

32'hffffd555

[18]

32'h4864b31d

32'ha33646fe

32'h5fdeba09

[19]

32'ha432598e

32'h519b237f

32'h2fef5d04

[20]

32'h52192cc7

32'ha8cd91bf

32'h17f7ae82

[21]

32'ha90c9663

32'h5466c8df

32'h0bfbd741

[22]

32'h54864b31

32'h2a33646f

32'h05fdeba0

[23]

32'haa432598

32'h9519b237

32'h82fef5d0

[24]

32'hd52192cc

32'hca8cd91b

32'hc17f7ae8

[25]

32'hea90c966

32'h65466c8d

32'he0bfbd74

[26]

32'h754864b3

32'hb2a33646

32'hf05fdeba

[27]

32'hbaa43259

32'h59519b23

32'h782fef5d

[28]

32'hdd52192c

32'haca8cd91

32'h3c17f7ae

[29]

32'h6ea90c96

32'hd65466c8

32'h1e0bfbd7

[30]

32'h3754864b

32'heb2a3364

32'h8f05fdeb

[31]

32'h9baa4325

32'hf59519b2

32'h4782fef5

Figure 18: A commonality is observed
A buffer’s hit signal is asserted to indicate the buffer’s active input (pe_reg) is found
in all other buffers.
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cam_comsym

Results[0]

Results[1]

Results[2]

Valid

Adj

[0]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[1]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[2]

32'hffffd555

32'h00000000

32'hd5542aab

32'h00000000

4'b1010

4'b1101

[3]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[4]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[5]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[6]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[7]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[8]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[9]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[10]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[11]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[12]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[13]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[14]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[15]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

-3

3

3

tally

Figure 19: Common patterns are stored in the common symbol array
When hit is asserted, the common pattern is stored in the common symbol array
(cam_comsym) and the active input result is captured in the results array.

The tally values shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20 contain voting outcomes
summed over time. The adj bits determine how the tally value for each PE is adjusted
each time voting is executed. The adj[0] bit determines if the weights are to be adjusted.
The other three bits, adj[1], adj[2], and adj[3], indicate whether the tally for PE1, PE2,
and PE3, respectively is to be incremented or decremented. If a PE result belongs to the
majority, its tally value is incremented. If the result is in the minority, tally is
decremented. If all PE results are matched or all are mismatched, the tally values are not
adjusted. After voting has completed for all test patterns, the PE(s) with the highest tally
is interpreted as healthy. The PE(s) with the lowest tally is deemed faulty. The tally
values are then reset and the process begins again.
36

cam_comsym

Results[0]

Results[1]

Results[2]

Valid

Adj

[0]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[1]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[2]

32'hffffd555

32'hd5542aad

32'hd5542aab
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4'b1111

4'b1011

[3]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[4]
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[5]
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32'h00000000
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[6]
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32'h00000000
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[7]
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32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[8]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[9]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[10]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[11]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[12]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[13]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[14]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

[15]

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

32'h00000000

4'b0000

4'b0111

-4

4

4

Tally

Figure 20: Voting is initiated
When all results for common pattern are available, voting is initiated. Tally is updated to
reflect voting outcome.

4.2 Fault Coverage with 1,200 Pseudorandom Input Patterns
Pseudorandom data may be used to test logic circuits. The number of
pseudorandom patterns required to provide 100% fault coverage is heavily dependent on
the circuit used as a processing element. The C6288 benchmark was selected as the PE. A
pseudorandom sample of 1,200 32-bit patterns was collected. A sample size of 1,200
patterns was chosen somewhat arbitrarily to be 100 times larger than the 12 patterns
provided in the C6288 documentation.
The 1,200 input test patterns were collected using a linear feedback shift register
(LFSR) and only saving every 32nd output pattern. The appearance of randomization is
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improved by completely shifting one pattern out of the LFSR before the next pattern is
taken. All 1,200 pseudorandom patterns were simulated with an ideal processing element
as well as all 4,896 possible faults. The result of this simulation is a data table with 4,897
rows and 1,200 columns. Each row represents a different fault state, and each column
contains output results for one of the input patterns. From this table, all analysis and
evaluations can be performed or derived to assess the design.
Fault coverage was evaluated iteratively by cycling through each fault node in the
data table to check for incorrect results. There were 17 SA0 fault nodes in which no
erroneous results were observed for any of the 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. The
un-activated faults were mapped to their location in the C6288, which is shown in Figure
21. Sixteen un-activated faults belong to the half-adder modules and one belongs to a full
adder module. Upon examination, these 17 faults are not observable because there is no
input combination that would ever cause these nodes to compute to logic 1. The fault
nodes are therefore perpetually SA0 by virtue of the C6288 design. The remaining 4,879
fault nodes are all activated by some subset of the 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns.
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Figure 21: Half and Full Adders containing un-observable faults [3]

Fault coverage for the C6288 benchmark has been calculated at several interval
set sizes between 1 and 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. Figure 22 shows the escapes
(non-activated faults) and fault coverage with respect to the pseudorandom input set size.
Escapes drop to zero and 100% fault coverage of the observable 4,879 possible faults is
achieved with 150 pseudorandom input patterns.
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Figure 22: Fault Coverage profile for C6288 Benchmark
The top plot shows the number of faults that are not activated by the input pattern
set. The bottom plot shows the fault coverage as percentage of observable faults
that are activated by the pseudorandom input patterns. Both plots are shown with
respect to the size of the pseudorandom input data set.

4.3 Fault Coverage with Multiple Faulty Elements
A lockstep TMR system effectively masks erroneous data if only a single
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redundant PE is faulty. This thesis considers the case in which multiple PE’s may be
faulty. The structural Verilog implementation of the C6288 benchmark contains 2,448
discrete nodes. Each node may be modeled as a SA0 or a SA1 fault. In total, there are
4,896 possible single stuck-at faults. A simulation was conducted in which
pseudorandom input patterns were used as inputs to three processing elements. The first
processing element contains no faults and its result is designated as G (Golden). The 2nd
and 3rd processing elements each contain a single stuck-at fault from the 4,896 possible
faults, and their outputs are designated F1 and F2 respectively. For this simulation, the
faulty elements are associative and each fault combination is only simulated once
(Fault1+Fault2 = Fault2+Fault1). The case in which Fault1 = Fault2 is discarded in the
simulation because aliased results would be generated anytime the fault is activated. A
total of 11,982,960 fault pairs have been simulated.

"    " =

## − 1 4,8964,896 − 1
=
= 11,982,960
2
2

The simulation used the data table from section 4.2 to hash together all possible
fault combinations and capture the voting results for all 1,200 pseudorandom test
patterns. The simulation output was written to text files with outcome statistics tabulated
for several pseudorandom input pattern set sizes. Exhaustive fault-pair analysis was
completed for a single point estimate with set sizes of 2, 3, 6, 12, 25, 50, 100, 200, 400,
800, and 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. Table 5 shows definitions for the tabulated
statistics obtained during the simulation for each fault-pair. In the explanation column, G,
F1, and F2 refer to the output results of the Golden, Faulty1, and Faulty2 elements
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respectively.
Table 5: Definitions for statistics obtained during simulation for each fault pair.
Column Name Example
Explanation

Fault Nodes
G_Tally
F1_Tally

1st element is Golden
2nd element has fault index 12
G_N12_N13 3rd element has fault index 13
Final tally vote count (unbiased) for 1st Element
606 after input set has been applied
Final tally vote count (unbiased) for 2nd Element
22 after input set has been applied

F2_Tally
ALIASES

Final tally vote count (unbiased) for 3rd Element
-22 after input set has been applied
282 Number of occurrences where F1=F2

G_0_Tally

Number of occurrences where there is no minority;
594 No change to G_Tally

G_1_Tally

Number of occurrences where G is in the majority;
606 Increment G_Tally

G_-1_Tally

Number of occurrences where G is in the minority;
0 Decrement G_Tally

F1_0_Tally

Number of occurrences where there is no minority;
594 No change to F1_Tally

F1_1_Tally

Number of occurrences where F1 is in the
314 majority; Increment F1_Tally

F1_-1_Tally

Number of occurrences where F1 is in the
292 minority; Decrement F1_Tally

F2_0_Tally

Number of occurrences where ther is no minority;
594 No change to F2_Tally

F2_1_Tally

Number of occurrences where F2 is in the
292 majority; Increment F2_Tally

F2_-1_Tally
XYZ[derived]
XXX[derived]

Number of occurrences where F2 is in the
314 minority; Decrement F2_Tally
312 Number of occurrences where G≠F1≠F2
282 Number of occurrences where G=F1=F2

The statistic from Table 5 that is of most interest is G_-1_Tally. The G_-1_Tally
counts the number of input patterns that generate aliased results for a given fault
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combination. This count is incremented for each pattern in which F1 and F2 agree, and
vote out G. Table 6 shows a summary of aliasing occurrences for different input pattern
set sizes. Aliasing occurs with over 99% of the activated observable faults in the C6288
benchmark. Only 28 activated observable faults never generate aliased results when
combined with any other fault during this simulation. In a lockstep TMR system with
multiple faulty C6288 elements, a substantial subset of possible fault combinations
(approximately 3.2%) exist that will produce aliased results and evict the correct result
for some input patterns.
Table 6: Aliasing Summary

Input Pattern
Set Size

2
3
6
12
25
50
100
200
400
800
1200

Unactivated
Observable
Faults

Activated
Observable
Faults

1577
905
398
111
58
5
2
0
0
0
0

3302
3974
4481
4768
4821
4874
4877
4879
4879
4879
4879

Activated
Observable
Fault
Combinations

5449951
7894351
10037440
11364528
11618610
11875501
11890126
11899881
11899881
11899881
11899881

Number
of Faults
that Alias

3288
3946
4447
4734
4793
4846
4849
4851
4851
4851
4851

Number
of Faults
that do
not Alias

14
28
34
34
28
28
28
28
28
28
28

Percentage
of Activated
Observable
Faults that
Alias

99.58%
99.30%
99.24%
99.29%
99.42%
99.43%
99.43%
99.43%
99.43%
99.43%
99.43%

Table 7 shows the number and percentage of fault combinations that alias with
respect to the pseudorandom input pattern set size. The fault combinations in the table are
comprised only of faults that are activated by the input pattern set. Figure 23 and Figure
24 graphically show the relationship between pseudorandom input pattern set size and the
frequency of aliasing fault combinations. With fewer input patterns, some faults may not
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be activated and therefore cannot contribute to aliasing. As the input set size increases,
fault coverage improves and more aliasing fault combinations are observed. Figure 22
showed that in this single point estimate, 100% fault coverage is achieved with
approximately 150 pseudorandom input patterns. A larger set of 1,200 patterns increases
fault activation and the frequency of aliasing in fault pairs. Figure 23 shows that as the
input set size increases, the percentage of fault combinations that alias approaches an
upper bound of around 3.2%. Figure 24 indicates this upper bound is around 380,000
fault pairs.
Table 7: Aliasing Fault Combinations.
Total Activated
Percentage of fault
Pattern Observable Fault
Aliasing Fault combinations that
set size Combinations
Combinations alias
5449951
96361
1.77%
2
7894351
145437
3
1.84%
10037440
205827
6
2.05%
11364528
276495
12
2.43%
11618610
317298
25
2.73%
11875501
353489
50
2.98%
11890126
369431
100
3.11%
11899881
377027
200
3.17%
11899881
378817
400
3.18%
11899881
379375
800
3.19%
11899881
379437
1200
3.19%

The simulation results have been filtered to include only the 379,437 aliasing fault
combinations from the 1,200 pattern set. Over 99% of activated observable faults are
found to alias with at least one other fault. The frequency that aliasing occurs for all
faults is shown in Figure 25. The distribution shows the percentage of possible fault
combinations that alias for all singular aliasing faults. For example, there are 797 singular
faults that alias with 3% to 3.5% of other faults. On average each fault aliases with
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Aliasing Fault Combinations (%)

approximately 3.2% of other possible faults.

Percentage of fault combinations that alias

3.30%
3.10%
2.90%
2.70%
2.50%
2.30%
2.10%
1.90%
1.70%
1.50%
2

20

200

Number of Pseudorandom Input Patterns

Aliasing Fault Combinations

Figure 23: Percentage of fault combinations that alias
Aliasing increases as coverage improves because more faults are activated. Only
activated and observable faults can contribute to aliasing. Therefore, the percentages in
this plot are given with respect to the total number of activated observable fault
combinations for each input set size.
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Figure 24: Aliasing Fault Combinations
As input pattern set size increases, observation of aliasing fault combinations increases
to a finite upper bound.
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Aliasing Frequency Distribution
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Figure 25: Frequency distribution of aliased fault pairs for all faults.
Shows the percentage of possible fault combinations that alias for all singular faults.
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The distribution in Figure 25 shows three distinct modes. The modes are
confirmed in the cumulative distribution plot shown in Figure 26. From Figure 26, 84.3%
of singular faults fall into Mode 1. 11.7% of singular faults fall into Mode 2, and 4% of
singular faults fall into Mode 3. Mode 1 indicates singular faults where aliasing was
observed for less than 211 fault combinations. Mode 2 indicates singular faults where
aliasing was observed for between 211 and 317 possible fault combinations. Mode 3
indicates singular faults where aliasing was observed for more than 318 possible fault
combinations.

Figure 26: Cumulative Distribution Plot of aliasing fault combinations
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There are two factors that contribute to the multiple distribution modes shown in
Figure 26. These factors are proximity and propagation paths. Proximity refers to the
spatial columnar distance between aliasing fault locations in the C6288 PE. 100% of
observed aliasing fault pairs are either in the same column or in an immediately adjacent
column in the PE. Figure 27 shows an example of fault proximity. A processing element
that contains a fault in column P6, shown in blue, may generate aliased results with a
processing element containing a fault in column P5, P6, or P7. No aliasing was observed
for faults pairs that are more than one column apart.

Figure 27: Aliasing Fault Proximity example [3]
A fault in column P6 (blue) will have aliasing fault pairs located in all adder
modules from columns P5, P6, and P7.
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The number of propagation paths for a fault also contributes to aliasing and
multiple distribution modes. Figure 28 shows the gate level schematics for the adders
used in the C6288. Faults that can propagate to both Sum and Carry outputs will have a
higher frequency of aliasing fault pairs than faults that only propagate to a single output.
In Figure 28, the outputs of g1 and g5 have propagation paths that include both the sum
and the carry output for the adder. Faults at g1 and g5, or faults equivalent to these, will
have more aliasing fault pairs because they have more propagation paths.

Figure 28: Gate level schematics of the adders used in the C6288
Gates g1 and g5 may be propagated to both the Sum and Carry outputs. Faults that
propagate to multiple adder outputs have a higher number of aliasing fault pairs. InputAND gates do not appear on each adder. They are shown here as options. All internal
stuck-at faults for the adders are shown here. Faults shown in red are equivalent,
collapsible equivalent faults that may be detected using patterns that would activate their
equivalent counterparts.
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Figure 29 shows the spatial relationship of aliasing faults and three distribution
modes from Figure 25. The X-axis contains the fault node index and are ordered as
follows:
1. Range 1-64 contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the 32 input nodes.
2. Range 65-576 contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the “and” gates that
provide inputs to the adders.
3. Range 577-4,896 contains faults within the matrix of adders. The adder
fault nodes are ordered from right to left and top to bottom. Each “spike”
represents one of the 16 matrix rows (partial product) in the C6288.
The scatter plot in Figure 29 shows that the number of aliasing fault combinations
is heavily dependent on the placement of the singular fault within a C6288 matrix row.
Each matrix row in the C6288 is a partial product used to perform the multiplication
function. A heavier concentration of aliasing fault combinations exists in the horizontal
center of the C6288. The horizontal center of the C6288 is recognizable in the scatterplot
by the 16 local maxima points. The local maxima points correspond to faults located in
the centermost adder module of each partial product row in the C6288 adder matrix from
Figure 21.
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Figure 29: Fault Alias Spatial dependence
The Node index (x-axis) provides information about the location of each fault in the
C6288. Range 1-64 contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the 32 input nodes. Range 65-576
contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the “and” gates that provide inputs to the adders.
Range 577-4,896 contains faults within the matrix of adders. The adder fault nodes are
ordered from right to left and top to bottom. Each “spike” represents one of the 16
matrix rows (partial product) in the C6288.

In Figure 28, the faults shown in red are collapsible equivalent faults. Equivalent
faults exhibit the same syndrome. In single stuck-at fault testing, equivalent faults are
collapsed such that only one fault is targeted for testing. Any equivalent faults are then
observable when testing the single targeted fault. To make testing more efficient, all
possible faults are collapsed to a minimal target set. A minimized set of input patterns is
computed to activate the target fault set. During test, the circuit operates on the minimal
set of test patterns to activate all possible faults. If no incorrect results are observed, the
circuit is deemed healthy. The documentation for the C6288 benchmark provides the
minimum set of 12 input test vectors. On average, with 4,851 observable faults in the
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C6288, each input test vector activates approximately 404 faults. High fault coverage
with a small input set is a benefit of using the single stuck-at fault model. Exhaustive
research has been done to improve the efficiency of fault collapsing and test pattern
generation. The C6288 is frequently used as a benchmark for evaluating the efficiency
and effectiveness of algorithms to collapse faults and minimize test patterns [8][9].
Identifying equivalence in fault pairs is necessary to make testing of large logic
circuits manageable. Testing a minimal target fault set with a minimal input pattern set
requires that the tester already know the correct result for each input pattern beforehand.
A comparator is then used to identify any mismatched results and label an element as
faulty. Lockstep TMR methodology inherits the assumption that, at most, only a single
fault is present. This assumption is maintained even though the processing element
hardware must be triplicated and additional hardware added to instantiate the voting
logic. The correct result is not known beforehand, and reliability is wholly dependent on
the presence of two healthy processing elements.
If two PE’s contain equivalent faults, then aliased results should be expected. In
this thesis, aliasing has been observed in fault pairs that are not equivalent. Lockstep
TMR may be a riskier scenario than conventional testing because the occurrence of
aliased results extends beyond equivalent faults. The data collected in this work for the
C6288 multiplier suggests that of all observable fault combinations, approximately 3.2%
generate aliased results for a subset of input patterns. When a second processing element
contains a fault, Lockstep TMR becomes less robust. The likelihood of propagating
incorrect aliased results increases. Time distributed voting (TDV) is proposed in this
thesis to provide active fault tolerant coverage when multiple PE’s are faulty.
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4.4 Fault Coverage using Time Distributed Voting
The design proposed in this thesis uses time-distributed voting (TDV) to
determine if processing elements (PE) are healthy or faulty. The tabulated result files
contain G_Tally, F1_Tally, and F2_Tally. These tally values represent the final weights
after accumulating majority voting results for all input test patterns. All tallies are first
initialized to an integer value of zero. With each pseudorandom test pattern, a vote is
executed to determine if and how the tally values for each PE are to be adjusted. If the
three PE’s generate identical results, then the tally values will remain unchanged. If a
majority of PE’s generate identical results, while a minority of PE’s generate mismatched
results, the tally values for PE’s in the majority are incremented and the tally values for
PE’s in the minority are decremented. If all three PE’s generate mismatched results, no
majority is observed and no adjustment is made to the tally values. After all test patterns
have been processed, the PE(s) with the highest tally is deemed healthy. The TDV
decisions are non-biased and are in no way skewed to favor the golden processing
element.
TDV is not immune to aliasing, but it relies on averaging to provide robustness
when multiple PE’s are faulty. When faulty elements generate correct results, they vote
with the Golden element(s) to increase its tally. Ideally, after all test patterns have been
processed, the Golden element(s) represents the dominant tally. Figure 30 contains the
Venn diagram of the expected behavior for non-aliasing fault pairs. The green
overlapping regions in the diagram indicate majority voting results that favor the Golden
PE and to its TDV tally value. Ideally, TDV would always favor the Golden element(s).
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In simulation using the C6288 PE, TDV was able to correctly identify the Golden PE for
96.8% of fault pairs with no observed aliasing.

Figure 30: Expected Venn diagram of Time-Distributed Voting.
When Faulty1 or Faulty2 generate correct results (green), they vote with the
Golden element. After processing all test patterns the Golden element is correctly
identified.

Over 99% of faults in the C6288 benchmark have aliasing fault pairs. The aliasing
fault pairs may be represented using the Venn diagram shown in Figure 31. Whenever
Faulty1 and Faulty2 results are identical, but different from the Golden result, the
G_Tally metric is decremented. If G_Tally is decremented too frequently, the outcome
after processing all test patterns may incorrectly identify the Golden element as faulty as
seen in Figure 32.
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Figure 31: Venn diagram for aliasing fault pairs
Here, the overlapping regions between Faulty1 & Faulty2 (red) adversely affect
vote averaging for the Golden element. As long as the overlap of Faulty1 & Golden
+ Faulty2 & Golden (green) is greater than Faulty1 & Faulty2 (red), TDV is able to
correctly resolve the Golden element.

Figure 32: Venn diagram when Golden element is evicted
When Faulty1 & Faulty2 (red) alias too frequently, the Golden element may be
erroneously evicted.
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Pseudorandom input patterns are used in the simulation to activate faults and
evaluate fault coverage. If the faulty PE’s contain aliasing fault pairs, the PE favored by
the TDV may change based on the input set size. Table 8 shows TDV outcomes for select
aliasing fault pairs using different pseudorandom input pattern set sizes. In Table 8, a 0
indicates the TDV outcome was correct for the indicated number of input patterns. A 1
indicates the TDV outcome was incorrect. The selected fault pairs show that TDV
outcomes may toggle between correct and incorrect as more patterns are presented to the
system. While aliasing coverage percentage remained essentially flat, the aliasing fault
pairs that are covered may shift with different input pattern sets. Coverage may not be
achievable for all aliasing fault pairs, but designers may be able to engineer input pattern
sets to optimize coverage of aliasing fault pairs.
Table 8: Aliasing fault pair TDV outcomes vary with input set size
PE1
PE2
PE3
Golden N997
N2263
Golden N4297 N4796
Golden N752
N2514
Golden N411
N3247
Golden N1000 N2759
Golden N997
N2008
Golden N872
N1121
Golden N868
N1121
Golden N3162 N4676
Golden N1823 N2577
Golden N3508 N4513
Golden N843
N3362
Golden N3745 N4760
Golden N435
N2694
Mean(XYZ) voting results
Mean(XXX)voting results

200
400
800
1200
Patterns Patterns Patterns Patterns
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
60.83
121.61
243.29
364.88
11.62
23.01
45.75
68.91
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The bottom two rows in Table 8 shows the number of patterns for each input set
size that generated identical results (XXX) and different results (XYZ). The occurrence
of XXX and XYZ results trends linearly with the input set size. In total, there are
approximately 11.9 million fault combinations that were tested during the TDV
simulation. The simulation used three C6288 PE’s. One element was ideal (Golden)
while 2 elements contained different faults (Faulty1 and Faulty2). The processing
elements are intended to operate on independent data streams with test patterns
interleaved into the data streams. Aliasing fault pairs were observed for over 99% of the
activated observable singular faults in the circuit. Observing common test patterns in the
three data streams created voting opportunities.
Table 9: TDV outcomes for 12 ATPG patterns
Test Patterns
% Correct No-Aliasing Pairs
% Aliasing pairs
% Correct Aliasing Pairs
% Total Correct Pairs
% Incorrect Aliasing Pairs

12 ATPG Patterns
97.52%
2.48%
0.50%
98.02%
1.98%

Table 9 shows TDV fault coverage for multiple faulty PE’s using the 12
engineered test patterns for the C6288. Table 10 shows fault coverage as a count of
passing and failing fault pairs with different pseudorandom input pattern set sizes. Table
11 shows fault coverage as a percentage of all possible fault pairs. TDV correctly
identified both healthy and faulty elements in approximately 96.8% of all fault
combinations because no aliasing was observed. An additional 1.8% coverage is obtained
by correctly identifying healthy and faulty elements in over half of the aliasing fault
pairs. The remaining 1.4% of fault pairs are escapes in which the healthy element is
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evicted in favor of a faulty element. Test escapes in which both faulty PE’s are deemed
healthy and the golden element evicted account for 0.02% of fault pairs. An equivalent
Lockstep TMR system provides no coverage for multiple faulty PE’s. In this single point
sample using the C6288, the proposed TDV design provides the same fault coverage as
lockstep TMR for single faulty PE’s and extends coverage to 98.6% of fault pairs that
may occur when two PE’s are faulty.
Table 10: Fault Pair Coverage Statistics by pattern set size (Integer count)
Test
Patterns

Total Fault
Pairs

Correct
No-Aliasing
Pairs

Aliasing
Pairs

Correct
Aliasing
Pairs

Total Correct
Pairs

Incorrect
Aliasing
Pairs

200

11,899,881

11,522,854

377,027

212,446

11,735,300

164,581

Test
Escapes
2724

400

11,899,881

11,521,064

378,817

214,242

11,735,306

164,575

2276

800

11,899,881

11,520,506

379,375

216,910

11,737,416

162,465

1942

1,200

11,899,881

11,520,444

379,437

217,408

11,737,852

162,029

1902

Table 11: Fault Pair Coverage Statistics by pattern set size (Percentage)
%
Aliasing
Pairs

% Correct
Aliasing
Pairs

% Total
Correct Pairs

%
Incorrect
Aliasing
Pairs

% Test
Escapes

Test
Patterns

Total Fault
Pairs

% Correct
No-Aliasing
Pairs

200

11,899,881

96.83%

3.17%

1.79%

98.62%

1.38%

0.0229%

400

11,899,881

96.82%

3.18%

1.80%

98.62%

1.38%

0.0191%

800

11,899,881

96.81%

3.19%

1.82%

98.63%

1.37%

0.0163%

1,200

11,899,881

96.81%

3.19%

1.83%

98.64%

1.36%

0.0160%
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Chapter 5

Conclusion and Recommendations

This thesis has explored challenges facing semiconductor manufacturers and
designers as defects become increasingly difficult to prevent. Fault tolerant methods,
such as TMR, have been discussed as options to protect yield and improve reliability. The
shortcomings of TMR are the motivation for research and the new fault tolerant
methodology proposed herein. TMR’s effectiveness is limited to cases where no more
than one processing element (PE) may be faulty. In practice, once a part is put into use,
the onset of multiple faults is neither predictable nor preventable. When multiple
processing elements are faulty in a TMR system, aliasing may cause the correct result, if
there is one, to be evicted and an incorrect result to be propagated.
The methodology proposed in this thesis is an active fault tolerant technique with
the ability to distinguish faulty elements from healthy elements in the presence of single
or multiple faults. Time distributed voting (TDV) is proposed as a technique that
accumulates voting results over time to recognize healthy PE’s. TDV has been
implemented in a Verilog HDL prototype design. The prototype design evaluates TDV
using the ISCAS ’85 C6288 benchmark as a PE. Simulations have been completed to
verify the design and evaluate fault coverage provided by TDV with faults injected into
multiple faulty processing elements.
The TDV technique was able to correctly identify the healthy processing element
for 98.6% of all fault pairs. TDV even provided coverage for some aliasing fault pairs
(1.84%). Based on results using the C6288 benchmark as the processing element, TDV
has successfully extended fault coverage to a system with single and/or multiple faulty
processing elements. TDV does not ensure detection of faulty elements in all cases.
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When PE’s contain aliasing fault pairs TDV may evict the healthy element as was
demonstrated with 1.4% of the fault pairs in the C6288.
Designers who consider using TDV should analyze the target PE to determine the
frequency of aliasing fault pairs. This work has shown that aliasing extends beyond
equivalent faults. Conventional fault collapsing does not capture all aliasing fault pairs.
TDV may not be an appropriate design choice for PE’s with a large number of aliasing
fault pairs. TDV may provide an effective alternative to lockstep TMR and enable fault
tolerant design of systems in the presence of multiple faults. The following
recommendations may further enhance the capabilities discussed in this work:
•

Adding more PE’s may further reduce the probability of aliasing faulty PE’s
to conspire against the healthy PE.

•

Probability of aliasing may be reduced by using PE’s with the same function,
but different implementation.

•

It may be possible to engineer a minimal test pattern set to further reduce
aliasing and better evaluate the PE.
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